New Dimensions in Jaina Logic

Author(s): Mahaprajna Acharya, Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Today and Tommorrow Printers and Publishers

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94 New Dimensions in Jaina Logic
whereas in ordinary sensory perception it is on account of extranecus conditions. The extra sensory perception depends on itself ard so the question of extraneous conditions determining its validity is irrelevant. A sensory perception is always dependent on other actors and this is why the origin of its validity is due to alien conditions. In case the conditioning factors of sensory perception are free from faults the resulting cognition is valid, but otherwise it is invalid.
The power of sensory cognition is very much limited and uncertain, and as such the line of demarcation between validity and invalidity in such case is very thin and indistinct. Acārya Akalanka has analysed the issue very minutely which is very significant being based on the doctrine of discussion of problems through divisions (vibhajyavāda). The validity or invalidity of a cognition, according to him, cannot be ascertained by any exclusive angle of vision. A cognition has a number of aspects. The aspect that is efficient in determining the nature of a real is the determinant of the validity of a cognition. The question of the validity and invalidity respectively of a perception or a pseudo-perception is thus problematic in the sense that a person, even though possessed of unimpaired and faultless senses, perceives the moon as touching the horizon which is obviously an illusion. Similarly a person of impaired vision sees double moon, the dual number in such cognition being contradictory. But such cognition is a valid cognition so far as the moon is concerned. What should, then, be the criterion of validity or invalidity? Akalańka asserts in this connection that even as a fragrant powder is so called because of the predominance of fragrance in it, in spite of its various other ingredients, just so the cognition which has a greater amount of concordance (with truth) is called a valid organ of knowledge (pramana), whereas a cognition with a preponderance of discordance is designated as an invalid piece of knowledge (apramāna). A sensory perception cannot enjoy an absolute validity on account of the limits of the power of sensory cognition and the relative character of the conditions that produce such cognition. It is on such grounds that Acārya Akalanka arrived at the doctrine of the problematic character of the criterion of validity and invalidity of a cognition. A very few among the logicians have been able to make a correct estimate of this great contribution of Akalanka to the field of Indian logical speculations.