New Dimensions in Jaina Logic

Author(s): Mahaprajna Acharya, Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Today and Tommorrow Printers and Publishers

Page 121

Organs of Knowledge 113
trustworthy person is non-discrepancy or non-contradiction in his statement. According to this connotation of apta any person who is not untrustworthy with reference to a subject is apta in respect of that subject.39
In the tradition of Jaina Logic Divine Revelation and impersonal scripture has no place or validity. Knowledge acquired by human beings and the scriptures composed by them enjoy authenticity in the Jaina tradition. A sound is composed of matter, being a transformation of the latter. As the transformation of matter it is evidently impermanent. When sound itself is impermanent, how can scripture that is composed of sounds (words) be considered as eternal?
According to the grammarian the sound of a syllable being momentary cannot produce the knowledge of the object. He, therefore, postulates an eternal entity called sabda (verbum) which is manifested through a syllable (varna) and is what is called sphota. The sphota is manifested by the sound of a syllable, and as a result the meaning is known.
According to the Mimamsakas the verbum is not subject to origination and cessation. It is eternal. It is not always heard because of the cover or obstruction. As soon as the cover is removed, we hear it. According to this doctrine, therefore, the verbum becomes manifest and is not newly produced.
The above view of verbum is not acceptable to the Jainas. According to them the origination of the word is a new occurrence due to collision of material bodies or their disintegration. When two objects are united or separated or broken, there arises the word.40 The power of expression is inherent in it, though the property of expressing a particular meaning is imposed on it by convention. Any word is competent to express any meaning, but convention confers on it the power of connoting a particular meaning in a particular context. The inherent power and the convention jointly make the word convey its particular meaning. Only the person who knows the convention is capable of knowing the meaning of a particular word. For example, the fire as fact is imposed by convention on the fire as word. If this convention is known to me, I shall be able to know the object fire signified by the word fire. A person, ignorant of the word agni in the Indian language, will not be able to know the object signified by the word.