New Dimensions in Jaina Logic

Author(s): Mahaprajna Acharya, Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Today and Tommorrow Printers and Publishers

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New Dimensions in Jaina Logic
In the Jaina tradition it was Acărya Siddhasena who defined inference for the first time. He was followed by his successors.
Probans (Hetu)
Ācārya Vasubandhu enumerated three characteristics of the probans which were further developed by Dignāga, according to whom the three characteristics are as follows:
1. Paksadharmatva-existence of the probans in the subject. 2. Sapaksasattva-existence of the probans in the homologue. 3. Vipkşāsattva-non-existence of the probans in the heterologue.
Dharmakirti in his Nyāyabindu improved the implication of these three characteristics by adding the particle 'eva' as follows:
1. pakse satt vameva---necessary existence of the probans in the
subject. 2. Sapksa eva sativam-existence of the probans exclusively in the
homologue. 3. Vipksa eva asati vam --non-existence of the probans in the
heterologue alone.
The Jaina logicians have rejected these three characteristics of the probans as insufficient conditions of inference. They proposed anyathānupapatti (logical impossibility in the absence of the other) or avinābhāva (universal concomitance) as the single characteristic of a probans. It was Svāmi Pätrakeśari who established
Sämänyatodrsta. Vatsyayana's example of this type of inference, from difference in location to the fact of a thing, having moved, is rejected on the ground that the relation is the reverse. We infer difference in location from motion, so that this is an example of sesavai. In place of Vātsyāyana's example Jayanta gives as an example of sämānyatodrsta the inference to a wood-apple's taste from its colour and other qualities. He apparently agrees with Udyotakara that any non-causal inference belongs here.
Jayanta reviews the second type of explanation offered by Vätsyāyana. In connection with sāmānyatodrstu there is a discussion with the Mimāmsakas as to whether its object is necessarily beyond the senses or not. The Mimāmsakas say no. They give as an example the inference to Devadatta's motion when it has not been seen. Another example is an inference about causal efficacy. Jayanta rejects these examples.
(Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol. II, page 363).