New Dimensions in Jaina Logic

Author(s): Mahaprajna Acharya, Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Today and Tommorrow Printers and Publishers

Page 155

Contribution of Jainism to Indian Logic
147
the Jaina logic the ultimate source and validity of experience is man himself. It is human being that is self-valid and not any particular scripture or text. The denial of the self-validity of any particular text and the acceptance of the self-validity of a human being is a very unique principle. The Pūrva-Mímāmsists accept the selfvalidity of text (like the Vedas) and deny the self-validity of a man. According to them a human being cannot be absolutely free from greed and attachment, and in the absence of such freedom nobody can claim omniscience, and a person who is not omniscient is not ipso facto a possessor of self-validity. According to the Jaina thinker it is possible for a human being to become absolutely free from greed and attachment and consequently attain pure and perfect knowledge and omniscience. This is why only a human being can claim the self-validity of his knowledge. The verbal assertions of such man or the books written by him derive their validity from the writer and are not valid in themselves. The self-validity of human experience is a fundamental contribution of Jaina logic. In the entire range of Indian logic it is indeed the Jaina tradition that is the chief and the earliest upholder of omniscience. And it is but natural that a huge literature devoted to the proof of omniscience is available in Jainism. The Buddhists have asserted the self-validity of Buddha's knowledge and the secondary authenticity of their texts, but they considered Buddha as the knower of dharma and not the knower of all things like the Jainas. According to the Pūrva Mimāmsa a human being cannot be the knower of dharma. The Buddhist, however, went a step farther and asserted that the nature of dharma is accessible to the human mind. The Jainas went still farther and affirmed that a human being can be an omniscient being as well. Kumārila has vehemently criticized the concept of omniscience upheld by the heterodox schools. The Buddhist philosopher Dharmakirti has dismissed the concept of omniscience as irrelevant to the knowledge of a religious prophet. He asserts that one may see at a distance or not, but let him see the truth that is profitable and beneficent. If a person who can see at a distance is a valid authority, come, let us worship the vultures who can identify the prey at a great distance!
The refutation of omniscience and the oblique accusation against it have been adequately answered by the Jaina logicians for over a millennium and a half and they have put up a strong defence against them.
Along with this influence of Jaina thought on other schools, it would not be irrelevant to discuss the counter-influence of the non