New Dimensions in Jaina Logic

Author(s): Mahaprajna Acharya, Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Today and Tommorrow Printers and Publishers

Page 129

Inference 121
anyathānupapatti as the characteristic of a probans by refuting the doctrine of triple characteristic in his work Trilakṣaṇakadarthana. In the Tattvasamgraha of Santirakṣita and the pañjika of Kamalaśīla a number of extracts have been quoted from Pātrasvami who criticised the triple characteristics of the probans initiated by Dignaga and elucidated by Dharmakirti. Both the forceful language and the logical cogency of the arguments of Pātrasvāmi are arresting. He has proved with convincing logic that the triple character does not necessarily entail the concept of universal concomitance (vyāpti) of the probans with the probandum and the lack of the latter reduces the triple character to an irrational inflation.*
We give below the verse reputed to be composed by Patrasvami which runs as follows:
anyathanupapannatvam yatra tatra trayeņa kim/ nanyathanupapannatvam yatra tatra treyena kim//
'Where there exists anyathānupapannatva, what purpose is to be served by the triple character, and where the anyathanupapannatva does not exist, what purpose is to be served by the triple character?'
The existence of the probans in the subject is not necessary for a probans to be valid in the inferential proposition 'the asterism Rohini will arise because the asterism Pleides (Kṛttikā) has already arisen'. The characteristic of existence of the probans in the subject is not available in this example. There is the relation of universal concomitance between the rise of the Kṛttikā asterism and the rise of the Rohini asterism that follows the Kṛttikā after one muhurta. But the 'rise of Krttikä asterism' does not exist in the subject 'the future rise of the Rohini asterism.' It follows from this that the existence of the probans in the subject is not an invariable characteristic of a probans.
In the syllogism the 'word is impermanent, because it is audible, i.e. it is the object of the auditory sense-organ' there is no homologue (sapakṣa) where the relation between word (sound) and audibility could be verified. Whatever is amenable to hearing is a sound and as such there is no scope for a homologue. A sound is
*Vaisali Institute Research Bulletin, No. 1, page 5.