New Dimensions in Jaina Logic

Author(s): Mahaprajna Acharya, Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Today and Tommorrow Printers and Publishers

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New Dimensions in Jaina Logic
only with the present, whereas in recognition the present perception is influenced by the memory of the past. The difference, if any, between perception and recognition is that the former is concerned with the present, pure and simple, whereas the latter is related to the present as qualified by an aspect that is past.
According to Jaina logician recognition cannot be a species of perception. The purpose of recognition is not the cognition of an object that is present, but it is the cognition of the identity of the object existing at two different times that is really intended. The function of perception ends with the knowledge of the present aspect of a thing and so the persistent identity cannot be comprehended by it.
As regards the nature of analogy (upamāna) there is no unanimity among the Indian logicians. The Buddhists do not admit analogy as a category separate from perception. The Vaišeşika logician includes it under inference. The Naiyāyika logician, however, admits it as an independent organ. In the tradition of the Jaina logic analogy (upamāna) is a kind of recognition. The argument in support of this assertion is: 'a gayal is similar to a cow'. The knowledge of the gayal and the cow is not a predominant factor here. What is predominant is the cognition of similarity between the two. And this is the reason why such cognition is not essentially different from recognition.
There should, however, be no objection if analogy is considered an independent organ, as was actually done in the earlier stratum of Jaina tradition. But it can be included under reognition in order to check the undue inflation of the number of organs of knowledge. It is for this reason that in the logical period analogy was considered a form of recognition (pratyabhijna).
Reasoning (tarka)
Tarka (reasoning) is an important term of Indian logic. Some specific topics are absolutely outside its domain. But even then in thought it enjoyed a great predominance from the beginning. It has a special significance in logic. The universal concomitance (vyāpti) is an essential factor of inference (anumāna) and the concomitance has an imperative need of reasoning without which the necessary character of concomitance cannot be determined. Almost all the schools of Indian logic have recognised the importance of reasoning. The diversity of opinion, if any, is about its validity as an inde