New Dimensions in Jaina Logic

Author(s): Mahaprajna Acharya, Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Today and Tommorrow Printers and Publishers

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98 New Dimensions in Jaina Logic
intuition) is not admitted as a valid organ by the Jaina logicians, on account of its undecided character as regards the object. A direct (super-sensuous) cognition, according to the Jaina logician, is 'immediately' cognitive of the object, whereas the indirect cognition knows the object only mediately, that is, through soine media.
A direct cognition in Jainism is twofold, viz. empirical (samvyāvaharika) and metempirical (paramarthika), the former being represented by the sensuous or mental experience and the latter by extra-sensory perception. The indirect cognition is of five kinds - memory, recognition, reasoning, inference and verbal testimony.
The self-conscious cognition is necessarily direct. It is twofold, perceptual and non-perceptual with reference to its nature as experience of the object. The cognition that is 'lucid' and instantaneous (visada) cognizes the object directly without any intervening medium, and there being no intercession between the knower and the known, is perceptual (pratyakşa). On the other hand, the cognition that does not fulfil the above conditions is non-perceptual (parokşa).
The lucidity-cum-instantaneousness (vaiśadya) is the defining characteristic of perceptual cognition. On account of its being dependent on the self (soul) alone it never lapses and falters in comprehending its object. And this is why it is transcendental or metempirical perception (pāramarthika pratyakşa). The sensuous or mental cognition, on account of its being not dependent on the self alone is not lucid-cum-instantaneous. In spite of this deficiency it cognizes the object more clearly and distinctly than inference and other kinds of non-perceptual cognitions. This also explains its character of being empirical as distinguished from the metempirical and the transcendental.23
Absence of lucidity-cum-instantaneousness is the determinant of non-perceptual cognition. Inference depends upon probans as its medium, and so it is devoid of the power of lucidity-cum-instantaneousness.
The perceptual cognition is indeterminate according to the Buddhist logician. The Naiyāyikas, however, consider it to be both, indeterminate and determinate. According to them the indeterminate cognition produces the determinate knowledge. In the Jaina