New Dimensions in Jaina Logic

Author(s): Mahaprajna Acharya, Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Today and Tommorrow Printers and Publishers

Page 107

Organs of Knowledge
99
tradition the perceptual cognition is of two kinds, viz. indeterminate and determinate as explained below. The gradual development of the sensuous and the mental perception is explained thus: There is a contact between the senses and the sense-objects in the beginning. The four senses excepting the eye and the mind, are in physical contact with their objects, while the latter two have no such contact. In other words, in the case of four senses there is a kind of direct contact with the object, but in the case of the eye and the mind the conjunction (sannipata) with the object is called appropriate ‘nearness'. This is followed by the intuition which cognizes the generic aspect of the object. And thereafter there is the comprehension of a particularized generic aspect (avāntara sāmânya) which is called determinate perception (avagraha). Such determinate perception is preceded by a contact-perception (sambandhabodha vyanjanāvagraha) in the case of the four senses, which is followed by the cognition of the object. The eye and the mind cognize the object straightway, there being no contactperception in their case. In determinate perception (avagraha) the object is indefinite ‘something', that is indescribable generic aspect, there being no thought in terms of name, class, substance, attribute and function.24 It is mere sensation bereft of any distinct judgmental character like, 'this is sound', 'this is colour' etc. Such determinate cognition is followed by doubt which brings up the rear of speculation (iha). Such investigation is made by means of the process of agreement and difference through propositions like, “this is being cognized by the ear and not by any other sense and hence it must be a sound'. This is followed by the determinate perception, this is definitely sound, which is called a perceptual judgment (avāya). This perceptual judgment gives rise to impressions which are called retention (dharanā).
The above cognition relates to the phase of soundhood of the audible object. The same process of determinate cognition, speculation, etc. is repeated in the case of the other phases of the sound. For instance, the determinate cognition (avagraha) 'this is sound' is followed by doubt, speculation etc, in the following way:“the sound is sweet, it is not harsh, hence it is the sound of a conch and not of a horn'. Such judgments fall under the speculation (ihā).
“This is definitely the sound of a conch', this is practical judgment (avāya). The non-lapse of the cognition 'this is the sound of a conch' is retention (dhāranā). In this way the finer and finer