New Dimensions in Jaina Logic

Author(s): Mahaprajna Acharya, Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Today and Tommorrow Printers and Publishers

Page 37

Jaina Logic of Philosophical Period
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possessor of scriptural knowledge knows all the substances, material as well as immaterial, but he cannot know all their modes. The omniscient knows all the substances with all their modes, and therefore it is said that he knows the complete truth. The possessor of scriptural knowledge knows the substances through the scriptures. The omniscient knows them directly and so he knows the whole truth. In the words of Acārya Samantabhadra, both syādvāda and omniscience are revealers of all objects. The difference between them, if any, consists in the latter's being a direct cognition and the former's being an indirect cognition.23 All other objects which are not cognised by either of them are unreal.
In Jaina ontology two kinds of substances are accepted-(1) sentient, and (2) non-sentient. Each substance is divided into infinitely infinite units, and each unit into infinitely infinite modes. All these substances with all their integral units, together with their modes, in their totality, constitute the complete truth. The monist can postulate the Absolute Truth (independent of anything else), but the dualist cannot agree with him. This is the reason why the Jaina philosopher, as an upholder of dualism, explains truth on the basis of his doctrine of non-absolutism. Truth has infinite modes and the capacity of language is limited. A word can express a single mode at a single moment, and as such the speaker can, in his whole life, give expression to only a limited number of modes. It, therefore, follows that the complete truth can never be explained through words; it is only a part of truth that can be the subjectmatter of linguistic expression.
Among western philosophers, Spinoza has made a distinct contribution about the nature of the substance.24 Substance, according to him, is that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; in other words, it is the conception which does not need the conception of another thing from which it must be formed. As distinguished from the substance, an attribute is that which the intellect perceives in the substance as if constituting its essence. By mode, Spinoza understands the affections of substance or that which exists in another thing through which also it is conceived. Substance, according to Spinoza, thus needs nothing else than itself for its existence or for its cognition. It is only the attributes and the modes which are susceptible of being cognised and known. The highest substance, according to Spinoza, is God, that is, Being absolutely infinite and consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.