New Dimensions in Jaina Logic

Author(s): Mahaprajna Acharya, Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Today and Tommorrow Printers and Publishers

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Doctrine of Nayas
existence of the effect in the cause (asatkāryavāda). In other words, whereas one of the viewpoints propounds the doctrine of the existence of the effect in the cause, the other denies it. Such opposition is not whimsical, because it is based on the divergent experiences of the thinkers. Both these experiences are certified by the behaviour of the reals. The generic attribute is as much a true component of a thing as the specific attribute. The generic attribute is eternal. The verbal or conceptual mode (vyañjana-paryāya) endures for a while whereas the objective mode (artha-paryaya) is evanescent and momentary. The causal relationship is applicable in the first two cases only, while in the latter case causality assumes a different meaning, for example, the doctrine of 'pratityasamutpada in Buddhism. Both these alternatives are based on two different truths and as such both are true. And this is why the two different viewpoints look at the two truths differently as they actually are and verbally represent them in accordance with their divergent experiences. A viewpoint is essentially an experience. It does not create the object. It is limited in its function to know the object and express it as it is. A real is not divided on the basis of the viewpoints but the latter are divided on the basis of the objectivity of the former. The philosophies based on absolutistic viewpoints accept as the whole truth either of the alternatives exclusively viz., the system propounding the generic attributes or a theory based on the specific characteristics. This is the reason why some among them assert the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, while the others deny it. The Jaina philosophers, however, regard the viewpoints as relativistic in nature on account of their origin from the relativisim of the generic and the specific attributes. The dialogues of Lord Mahavira as recorded in the Ardhamagadhi canon are all permeated with the spirit of relativism. And this is why the doctrine of the pre-existence of the effect in the cause and the doctrine of non-existence of the effect in the cause are both considered as relatively true by the Jaina thinkers. The apparent mutual contradiction of the two alternatives is explained on the basis of their relativistic approach. The former is a valid estimate of the aspect of generic attribute, while the latter derives its validity on account of being concerned with the specific attributes of a real. Both the estimates are objectivistic and are based on relativism. The generic as well as the specific attributes belong to the same object, as limited to themselves, and as such are free from mutual opposition or inconsistency. If the two aspects are not mutually opposed or inconsistent, why should the diverse experiences arising from them be considered as mutually contradictory. The appearance of contra
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