New Dimensions in Jaina Logic

Author(s): Mahaprajna Acharya, Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Today and Tommorrow Printers and Publishers

Page 90

82 New Dimensions in Jaina Logic
syādvāda seems to have given the logical background of statistical theory in a qualitative form.
Secondly, I should like to draw attention to the Jaina view that 'a real is a particular which possesses generic attributes.' This is very close to the concept of an individual in relation to the population to which it belongs. The Jaina view, in fact, denies the possibility of making any predication about a single and unique individual which would be also true in modern statistical theory.
The third point to be noted is the emphasis given in Jaina philosophy on the relatedness of things and on the multiform aspects of reals which appear to be similar (again in a purely qualitative sense) to the basic ideas underlying the concepts of association, correlation and concomitant variation in modern statistics.
The Jaina views of 'existence, persistence and cessation' as the fundamental characteristics of all that is real necessarily leads to a view of reality as something relatively permanent and relatively changing which has a flavour of statistical reasoning. 'A real changes every moment and at the same time continues' is a view which is somewhat sympathetic to the underlying idea of stochastic processes.
Fifthly, the most important feature of Jaina logic is its insistence on the impossibility of absolutely certain predication and its emphasis on non-absolutist and relativist predication. In syādvāda the qualification 'syat' that is, 'may be or perhaps' must be attached to every predication without any exception. All predication, according to syâdvada, thus, has a margin of uncertainty which is somewhat similar to the concept of 'uncertain inference in modern statistical theory. The Jaina view, however, is essentially qualitative in this matter (while the great characteristic of modern statistical theory is its insistence on the possibility and significance of determining the margin of uncertainty in a meaningful way). The rejection of absolutely certain predication naturally leads Jaina philosophy continually to emphasize the inadequacy of 'pure' or 'formal' logic, and hence to stress the need of making inferences on the basis of data supplied by experience.
I should also like to point out that the Jaina view of causality as a relation of determination based on the observation of