New Dimensions in Jaina Logic

Author(s): Mahaprajna Acharya, Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Today and Tommorrow Printers and Publishers

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New Dimensions in Jaina Logic
karma is agent of itself. If the soul were the agent of karma, he would never be free from it. And it is exactly because he is not the agent, he is capable of getting rid of karma. From the absolute substantial standpoint, it is true that the nature can never change. Consciousness has a specific nature which is conscious. It can never lapse. Self-awareness is its specific function. How could then it be the agent of the karma which is a heterogeneous entity? This is the standpoint of pure substance, independent of any adventitious adjunct. One can defend the Samkhya's assignment of bondage and emancipation to the Prakrti. In the language of Jainism one can similarly say that it is only the karmic body that is subject to bondage and emancipation. From the semi-absolute substantial standpoint one could assert that the jiva (the soul) is the agent of karma. The substantial standpoint is concerned exclusively with the universal. The mode sinks into insignificance when the universal is predominant. Permanence is true because a thing not only exists but exists for ever. An entity's continuance for long gives an impression of its uninterrupted continuity. When we concentrate on similar or the identical aspects of a thing, the philosophy of identity, universality or substance presents itself as the only valid alternative. The flow of origination and cessation is going on without interruption. How could one say that the mountain that his ancestors saw still continues to exist? Or the person in front is the same whom he saw yesterday? The old atoms are constantly giving place to new ones. A person's atomic physical conglomerate is being constantly emitted and replaced by a facsimile. In the absence of such emission the method of photography of the absent object could never be successful. This movement of atoms proves impermanence of the substance. The successive vision of similar modes gives an impression of permanence, exactly as the attention directed to the discrete modes gives rise to the impression of impermanence. Under these two diverse situations how should we distinguish between the truths of permanence and impermanence? The falsity of the one would entail the truth of the other, which would lead to the controversy that exists between the rival camps, each believing in one or the other alternative. Non-absolutism, however, does not admit the absolute validity of any one of these alternatives. According to it neither permanence independent of impermanence nor impermanence independent of permanence is the whole truth, both being true only relatively.? There is no creation, according to Kundakunda, without destruction and no destruction without creation and no creation-cum-destruction without continuity or eternity. The synthesis of the three-creation, destruction and continuity-is the