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The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism
substratum (sahānavasthānalakṣaṇa); and (4) the opposition of obstruction (pratibadhyapratibandhakabhāva), found to obtain between two facts, when the presence of one prevents the occurrence or activity of the other. Now of these four, the last three types of opposition are known from experience and not a priori. The idealist agrees with the realist in his contention that the relation of opposition should be ascertained from experience alone so far as these three types are concerned. But the first type of opposition is, according to the idealist, known a priori and without appeal to experience. It is known by intuition, pure and transcendental. It can be verified by experience, but experience is not the determinant of its validity. It is valid universally and necessarily. It is argued that the apodeictic certainty and the universal necessity of this law of opposition cannot be derived from empirical knowledge, which is by its very nature vitiated by contingency and particularity. Experience cannot furnish any corrective to its verdict. The Law of Contradiction is based upon this type of opposition and so also is the Law of Excluded Middle. The opposition between being and non-being is known a priori and does not stand in need of verification to validate it. Its validity is self-certified, and though experience may illustrate its truth, it does not confer validity upon it. Its validity is intrinsic, being derived from the aprioristic constitution of our thought-principle. If experience is found to be in consonance with this law, as known a priori, it is true and valid, and if it is found to be at variance with it, it must be rejected as false. What is said to be true of the Law of Contradiction is true of the other laws in the same way and in the same degree. The idealist, in arguing the consequences of the a priori validity of these laws, observes that these Laws of Thought are also the laws of being. It cannot be supposed that being and thought are opposed to each other. On the contrary they are the same stuff, though 'thought' is rather prior to being so far at any rate as the nature of reality is revealed to us. Thought seems to have chronological precedence, if not logical or ontological priority. To take a concrete instance, let us consider the opposition between square and circle. We cannot conceive that a square can be a circle, as the very idea is repugnant. The opposition of the two is known a priori. If experience were the source of the knowledge
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