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Numerical Difference and Absolute Non-Existence
51
of contents. The logical consequence of the postulation of a numerically identical awareness in the presence of a multiplicity of contents is the inescapable proposition that the awareness in question is numerically different from the contents. Thus not only the difference of the contents from one another, but also that of the awareness from each one of these contents, is to be admitted on pain of self-contradiction. This result also undermines the assertion of the fundamental unity of awareness and its contents as advocated by the Buddhist idealist. The Jaina theory squares with the exigencies of the situation. The relation of awareness to its contents or the objective data is neither one of simple identity nor one of simple otherness, but one partaking of both the characteristics. There is no contradiction between identity and otherness, as they are not absolute characteristics. The contradiction would be insurmountable if awareness and its contents were affirmed to be identical in an absolute reference, that is to say, exclusive of the aspect of difference. But the identity and otherness asserted by the Jaina philosopher are only partial and limited and not complete and unqualified. The Vedāntist is correct, while refuting the Buddhist idealist in his assertion that the relation of cognition and cognitum is neither one of identity nor one of difference. But the Jaina joins issue with the Vedantist when the latter asserts the relation in question to be a case of illusion on the ground of the incompatibility of identity and difference which are presupposed by the relation. The Jaina asserts that the contradiction would be undeniable if the two traits spoken of were absolute characteristics. But they are not absolute and so the reading of contradiction by the Vedāntist seems to be only a hasty conclusion in the view of the Jaina philosopher.
The unity of the cognition having diversified contents is also to be regarded as only a part-characteristic. The cognition is a unity as well as a plurality. The contents are not absolutely different and distinct. A relation presupposes that two terms which were once apart are now held together. The relation is the cementing bond between them. Things which are absolutely autonomous and independent of one another cannot be brought into relation, or to put it the other way round, the relata have to shed their exclusive autonomy and discreteness if
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