________________
142
The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism
predicated would thus be determinate. The full import of the second proposition thus amounts to the following — 'The jar is the substratum of non-existence as determined by the nature of pen-and-the-like.' As non-existence is identical with the reality in which it subsists, the non-existence of pen and the like would be identical with the jar. The propositions only affirm the truths which have been established by us in the second Chapter.
We have repeatedly asserted that existence and non-existence are always determinate. Existence is determined by the specific nature or individuality of the subject (svarüpa) and non-existence is in its tu n determined by the nature or individuality of things, which are different from the subject (pararūpa). There are also other determinants of existence and non-existence, viz., substance (dravya), location (ksetra), and time (kāla). What are we to understand by these determinants ? To return to the example given, 'The jar exists,' the predicate 'existence' is said to be determined by the nature of the jar. But what is the exact significance of the expression 'nature of the jar ? The Jaina answers the question in his characteristic way. It is not necessary according to him to enter into a metaphysical discourse to determine the nature of the jar. It all depends upon the universe of discourse. By 'the nature of the jar' one can understand the connotation of the term, which, in terms of ontology, is the uniform attribute or attributes that characterize all jars, and by the nature of others' one can understand the connotation of the terms expressing pen and the like. The existence of the jar would thus be determined by the attributes which invariably present themselves to our mind when we think of the jar. The result is the same. A jar exists so far as it possesses the attributes which we associate with it in our thought. If a jar were to exist as partaking of the attributes of a pen, the jar would not be distinguishable from the pen. And if, again, it did not exist as possessed of the attributes which characterise it just as it does not exist as possessed of the attributes of pen and the like, it would be a non-entity like a sky-flower. The nature of a real is, however, composed of an infinite number of attributes, which cannot be fully comprehended by the limited intellect that mankind normally possesses. But that does not make our knowledge unreal or false, though undoubtedly it must be
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
