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The Jaina Conception of Universals
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be a party to either of these positions without neutralizing the fundamental principle of non-absolutism. So the apparent repudiation of universals is to be interpreted as the repudiation of absolute unity of existents involved in the conception of unchanging self-identical universal running through them. In other words, the universal quâ existence is a unity in difference, which does not entirely merge its being in the particulars in spite of its participation in them.
Vimaladása further contends that similarity cannot account for the identity of reference of individuals, if the former be ontologically different in each case of its incidence. Similarity cannot be an ultimate category. Similarity is nothing but the possession of a common identical attribute or attributes by numerically different entities. The face of a lovely woman is compared by the poet to the moon. But where lies the similarity of the two ? It must be supposed that the face shares a common attribute with the moon, the selfsame attribute of beauty, which causes delight to the connoisseur. Similarly, the similarity of one pe with another pen, of one man with another man, is to be traced to an identical attribute, namely, the pen-universal or the manuniversal, which is shared in common by the individuals concerned. The denial of a self-identical quality in several individuals would on the other hand make the distinction of common and uncommon attributes indefensible. A common attribute is but the selfsame attribute which exists in more than one individual and an uncommon attribute is but what is peculiar to a particular individual, unshared by any other. If the possibility of the occurrence of a selfsame attribute in more than one substratum is denied, then no quality would be common. There is no valid ground for dismissing this distinction as an unfounded illusion, since it is not contradicted by experience as other illusions are.
The idea of similarity is there and it cannot be explained without reference to an identical element. The reality of simila-- rity again cannot be repudiated unless the knowledge of the same be declared false, for which there is no warrant, and similarity again ultimately presupposes a universal. But it may be contended that similarity is an unanalysable characteristic - as ultimate as identity or difference is. In point of fact, the school of Prabhākara and following them the school of Madhva maintain
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