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The Jaina Conception of Universals
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query why A and B are similar by the simple answer that they are similar, since the answer is tautologous. We hold that there is no justification for holding similarity to be an ultimate concept either as a category or as a relation and this is shown by the fact that the questioner is not silenced until a common characteristic is pointed out.
But the later Jaina philosophers have contended that the relation between universal and particular does not involve or presuppose identity of being. The element of identity in the identity-in-difference as the presupposition of relation is to be understood negatively as the absence of separate locus and positively as the necessity of coincidence. We have shown that this is the character of inherence as set forth by the Vaišeşika. If relation between universal and particular were one of mere necessary coincidence, the elaborate refutation of inherence and the positing of identity-in-difference as the ground of relation would be so much waste of labour. Nay it would be an act of make-believe inasmuch as it makes a show of difference when it is in entire agreement with the conception of inherence as propounded by the Vaiseșika. Not only this, the dismissal of identity as a case of invariable coincidence would make the whole philosophy of non-absolutism a hollow pretence. The relation of modes to the substance in which they occur is asserted to be identity in difference and the contradiction involved in it is solved by positing a separate category (jātyantara), which is not explicable in terms of identity or of difference, being an embodiment of both the elements in its being. But the assumption of such a separate category would be absolutely uncalled for if the theory of necessary coincidence could meet the situation. Furthermore, the postulation of avaktavya inexpressible) as a separate category, which we have discussed in Chapter V, would have no raison d'etre, if the element of identity involved in the relation only meant necessary coincidence and nothing more. It is the concept of avaktavya, however, which gives the Jaina philosophy its distinctive character and individuality. But the later Jaina philosophers, who were rather frightened out of their wits by the flourish of Dharmakirti's criticism, have given a wide berth to the Jaina conception of avaktavya by unconsciously reinstating the conception of inherence as the solvent
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