________________
178
The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism
whether there is any relation at all between reals quâ objective, and secondly, whether inherence as internal relation has any special claim to privileged treatment.
Now, the reality of relation has been denied by the Fluxist, the Vedantist and by Bradley. It is a remarkable proof of the community of human thought that the arguments of Bradley were all anticipated by the Buddhist and the Vedantist several centuries before. It has been urged that there can be no relation between two terms, which are independent. Relation presupposes that the terms are brought together. But what would bring them together? If it be a relation, how does it supervene upon them, unless it is supposed that the terms are predisposed to be brought into a whole ? 'A' and 'B' are different and distinct, and if they are brought together by means of a relation, the relation must be supposed to induce a change in their nature, or to follow upon this change induced by an external factor. But this supposition only introduces a complication. If the relation were a tertium quid, it would necessitate another relation to bring this third entity into relation with the terms. Thus, the third would require the services of a fourth, and the fourth of a fifth and so on without end. But unless there is a predisposition in the terms to come to one another, it is unintelligible why a relation does not hold between anything and everything. The assumption of predisposition would again necessitate a relation between the term which develops predisposition and the condition which induces it. Not only this, the predisposition being a property of the term would require a relation, by the good offices of which it can belong to the term in question. And the same difficulty would arise with regard to this new relation and the relata.
Nor can it be supposed that relation is nothing but the absence of gap (nairantarya) between two terms, that is to say, the terms in relation are just close to one another and not separated by a gap in between them. But if absence of gap may be a relation, why should not separation by a gap be also a relation? However close the terms may be brought together, they cannot be supposed to abandon their separateness, unless there be a unification of the terms. But if this unification be a total merger of one in the other, no relation would be necessary, as
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
