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The Jaina Conception of Universals
269
But are different things different in respect of their existence ? In other words, is the existence of one absolutely different from the existence of another ? The Jaina answers that this is not possible. Thus, for instance, the existence of cognition cannot be different from that of the object. Both are existent, because both have a common existence. If cognition were different from its object, even in respect of its existence, it would mean that the cognition is not existent. The non-existence of cognition would involve the non-existence of the object, as there would be no proof of it. A thing is known to exist only when it becomes the object of a cognition. But the subject-object relation presupposes that the two in spite of their separate identity are held together by a common bond of unity. This bond of Unity is the common element of existence. It has been contended that the numerical difference of one existent from another existent does not prove that one or both are non-existent fictions. The difference can at most imply that one existent is not identical with another existent. So there is no logical necessity for positing one identical existence running through all. But the Jaina does not endorse this contention. The question is whether the different existents can have existence without a common existence. It is not denied that the existence of one is also different from the existence of the other. But the separate existences are only specific instances of one common existence. If this common existence were not an objective fact but only a subjective idea, the different entities would also be deprived of their title to existence. In other words, they would become subjective fictions as unreal as the universal is represented to be by the Buddhist." It follows therefore that even cognition and its object are identical in respect of their existence although they differ in respect of their individualities.2
The different categories, viz., the selves, matter, time, space and so on, are deductions from experiential data. They have been posited since general concepts presuppose their existence and
1. satsämänyasya 'bhāve sāṁvstatve vă tadviśeşāņām abhāvaprasangat sarvịtatvåpatteś ca. Ibid, p. 167.
2. sadātmanä сa bhinnam ced jñānam jñeyad dvidhā 'py asat. AM, p. 30.
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