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The Nyāya Conception of Universals
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privileged member concerned cannot be picked out, the mere knowledge that one at least is true does not make a difference, so far as our theoretical belief and practical activity are concerned. Moreover, the self-identical causal activity, on which the Buddhist places his reliance, cannot be thought to proceed from one single condition, but from a totality of conditions, which forms a complex. An individual alone cannot produce any effect, but cnly when it is a member of such a group of individuals. A seed, for instance, cannot produce a sprout by itself, unless it is associated with a number of auxiliary factors, such as water, soil and the like. So the theory of one activity of one individual cause cannot be accepted as the explanation of the problem of perception we are considering. The hypothesis of the reduplication of similar facts in a continuum does not also give any advantage in this regard, since the several continuum of each of the factors involved in causation is also equally entitled to consideration. If, however, the application of the Joint Method be thought to throw a light on the specific contribution of each factor, the seed may be regarded as the specific cause of sprout, no doubt. But the same rule also holds good in the case of the different perceptions of the tree. The tree is a reality, a substance, a tree, oak or elm, and all these facts have their specific causal efficiency. The causal efficiency of substance is in respect of its qualities and that of a tree is in respect of its characteristic features, branches, leaves and the like. The objects of the series of perceptions are thus each real, as they equally pass the test of causal efficiency. Nor are the different causal efficiencies incompatible with the identity of the tree, as the tree is all the things rolled into one.
The difference of contents does not prove the numerical difference of the object, but only when they are incompatible with one another and with the identity of the substance. The same substance, viz., light, produces illumination, removes darkness and generates heat. But the difference of effects or of causal efficiency is not believed to entail a difference of identity in the substance of light. The same law should apply in the case of perception. The differences of contents of perception have been shown to be the effects of the different elements, which are present in a self-identical real. The difference of contents in the
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