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The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism
element in it. So a fiction also cannot function as the bond of similarity. The Buddhist may rejoin that the similarity in question is not believed to be objective. It is only a subjective idea. The object of non-perceptual cognition is only believed to be similar to the real object. But Udayana would submit that the problem is, why should there be such a belief at all ? The grounds of belief adduced by the Buddhist have been examined and found to afford no light on the solution of the problem.
The Naiyāyika has heckled the Buddhist from all sides. Jñanaśri has been constrained to admit virtually the failure of the aforesaid explanations. But he maintains that though a real is not envisaged by conceptual cognition, yet it can inspire volitional impulse towards a real by virtue of a natural power. It is admitted even by the Naiyāyika that a cause produces an effect which was not in existence before. But how can there be a factual relation between a real cause and an unreal effect ? For the explanation of the situation we have to appeal to the ultimate nature of things, which we have to accept without question. There can be no answer to the question, 'why should fire produce smoke and not water" ? The case of conceptual knowledge is on the same footing with causality. The Naiyáyika, however, is not satisfied with this explanation. He maintains that if conceptual cognitions did not bear a definite relation to reals, why should they refer to them or inspire activity towards them ? The appeal to natural power is only an argument of despair. The Naiyāyika admits that conceptual knowledge has by its very nature a reference to an object. This objective reference is determined by its very nature no doubt. But that does not mean that the reference in question is possible without a real objective relation. The relation is nothing else than one obtaining between an object and its cognition (vişaya-visayibhāvasambandha). That this relation is ultimate and simple is not open to question since no other ultimate relation can explain it. As regards the analogy of the causal relation trotted out by Jñānasri, it would suffice to observe that there is a definite relation between cause and effect. The cause and effect are always determined by reference to their relevant universals. It is, therefore, possible to assert that fire as such is the cause of smoke as such.
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