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The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism
There are two problems of a consequential nature, which we cannot help adverting to with a view to making our representation of the Naiyáyika's criticism of the Buddhist theory of universals as thorough as the original account. The problems are, viz., (1) Are our sense-organs competent to envisage universals ? (2) Is language directly cognisant of reality as it is ? The Buddhist denies both the possibilities. According to him particulars are alone real and universals are subjective constructions. Accordingly our sense-organs are in touch only with particulars and not universals. Consequently particulars are alone sensed and universals which are cognized in perceptual judgment are non-sensuous in character. The felt immediacy of determinate judgment is only a case of transference of character. The immediacy of the indeterminate cognition, which is alone perceptual, is wrongly transferred to the determinate judgment that directly follows in its wake. But the Naiyáyika does not agree with the Buddhist interpretation of perceptual knowledge. He not only believes in the reality of the universals, but also in their being perceivable like the individuals in which they are manifested. The Naiyāyika does not deny that there may be universals which are imperceptible. But he strongly refuses to believe that the universals attaching to perceptible individuals are imperceptible.
The Buddhist thinks that all judgments are non-perceptual in character. But why should the determinate judgment following an indeterminate sense-intuition be non-perceptual ? Whether a cognition is immediate and perceptual is to be determined by the bearing of the sense-organ involved. When a thing is judged to be seen or heard following the operation of a sense-organ, there is no reason to deny that the judgment is sensuous. The felt immediacy of the judgment proves that it is perceptual and sensuous. There is no psychological or logical consideration which should compel us to regard the felt immediacy as a case of vicarious cognition. It is no objection that the sense-organ does not at once generate a determinate perceptual judgment when it is capable of doing so. The Naiyáyika maintains that possession of capacity is only one of the conditions of the generation of an effect, and left to itself, it cannot produce the expected result. Capacity comes into play only when it is associated
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