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The Nyāya Conception of Universals
261
quality of the man and this can be expressed in the form that the man does no longer possess a stick. The case is similar with the universal. The universal is all the while there, but when an individual appears on the scene, we say there is a cow here and when the same individual departs from the place, we say “there is no cow here'. The universal may be compared with the man of our example and the individual with the stick. The presence and absence, ingress and egress, of the individual do not mean the corresponding change of attributes so far as the universal is concerned.1
A difficulty has been raised by an advocate of non-absolutism. If the universal and the individual were absolutely different, the co-existence of the two would be logically indefensible. It should therefore be admitted that the two are neither absolutely different from nor absolutely identical with each other. But the Naiyāyika does not subscribe to the justice of this contention. He asserts on the contrary that if co-existence means relation with a common substratum, it is quite legitimate, nay logically necessary, that the terms so related should be numerically different. It is a fact that the universal and the individuality do co-exist in the individual and their co-existence is not incompatible with their numerical difference. It has been asked why should not then the cow-universal and the horse-universal co-inhere, if numerical difference be no bar ? But the question is nothing short of a cavil. It is maintained that things co-related to a common substratum are numerically different. It does not follow from this assertion that all numerically different things should be co-existent or co-related.
The fact that there may be things which though different are not co-existent or co-related does not invalidate such co-relation between all numerically different facts. But why should such a relation exist between some facts and not others ? The Naiyayika replies that the co-existence or co-relation in question is not due to the partial identity of the terms, but rather to an inherent difference of nature of them, which is to be admitted as
1. dese käle ca sămânyasvarūpam asti, pindopagamāpagamădină gaur asti gaur nästi 'ti vyavahāraḥ, yathā 'vicalati Caitre dandopagamăpagamābhyāṁ dandi Caitro nā 'yam dandi 'ti vyavahāraḥ. ATVS. p. 410.
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