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The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism
'is' meant 'is manifested'. Our ordinary assertions such as there is no cow here or its explanatory form 'it does not possess cowhood' are only loose modes of expression. The denial of cowhood in such propositions is to be understood as nothing more than the denial of manifestation due to the absence of an individual. The absence of an individual, due to its non-existence or departure from a place, is expressed as the non-existence of the universal concerned. But these assertions are not based on a correct estimation of the nature and relation of universal and the individuals.
The universal is a self-existent principle and the predication of its non-existence in respect of space or time is logically false just as it is ontologically unreal. The non-existence of an individual before its birth can only mean that the universal is not related to it. It does not mean that the universal was not existent at the time that the individual was non-existent. The universal is self-contained so far as its existence is concerned. The individual is required only to make the universal related to it.1 It may be urged that the relation of inherence, being eternal like the universal, cannot also be non-existent like the latter. So universal and inherence being present all the time the former should always appear as related. But this contention is based on forgetfulness of the fact that the apprehension of relation presupposes not only the actual existence of relation but also of the terms. The relation is not therefore apprehended so long as the individual, which is the other term, does not present itself. The raison d'etre of our assertions, viz., 'there is a cow' or 'there is not a cow' is to be found in the presence or absence of the individual called 'cow' and not in that of the universal which is ever-existent. The situation can be brought home by a concrete example. Suppose a man stands in a place and somebody puts in his hand a stick. The man may then be legitimately stated to be one who bears a stick. Suppose that somebody takes away the stick and this makes a difference in the
1. svarūpasattvāsattvayor dvitiyānapekṣatvāt sambaddhatvāsambadddhatve tu dvitiyāpekṣe. ATV. p. 408.
2. yady api tayoḥ sambandhaḥ samaväyaḥ sa cã 'styeva tatha 'py asată piņḍena tannirūpaņam nāsti, ATVB. p. 410.
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