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The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism
verbal cognition gives only a pale picture. Certainly, he makes an extravagent demand on our credulity when the Naiyāyika asks us to believe that it is the same substance that is distinct and indistinct, pale and bright. Why should there be a difference of quality in the contents if they are due to the same real ? It is also to be explained away by the quantitative theory by the Naiyayika ? But the Naiyāyika denies that the situation creates a problem at all. So far as the substantive real is concerned it is neither distinct nor indistinct. Consequently, there is no qualitative difference in the content of consciousness relating to the substance. The distinctness and indistinctness are due to the varying cognition of qualities. A substance is cognised with a greater number of qualities in perception and so is felt to be more vivid and distinct. In non-perceptual cognition the number of qualities is much less, as sensible qualities are not cognised in it. So the distinctness or indistinctness of contents is due to the numerical ratio of the qualities, that are perceived or unperceived along with the substance. The variation of the contents has, therefore, reference to the adjectival qualities and has nothing to do with the substantive core of reality. The so-called qualitative variation of the contents of consciousness with reference to the same thing observed from proximity and distance should be regarded as a pointer. It can be explained only if the theory of numerical variation of qualities as the cause of the difference be adopted. The situation cannot be made the ground for repudiating the objective reference of non-perceptual cognitions. Nor can it be construed as evidence of perceptual cognition being the only type which is cognisant of reality.
But the Buddhist has contended that the variation of contents due to distance is also an instance of unfounded cognition. The position, which he maintains, is this. There could be no variation in the quality of cognitions if they were conversant with the same reality. So perception from distance is not believed to be
1. kevaladharmyapekṣayā sphuțăsphuţa-pratibhasabheda eva năsti. Nārāyana's Com. p. 140.
2. bahutarālpataradharmavaddharmibhedavişayatvam eva sphuțăsphuţa-pratibhāsatvam, nadhikam. ATVD. p. 336.
3. ata eva dharmivişayake 'pi dūrāntikapratyakşe sphută-sphuţatvam drstam. ATVS. p. 336.
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