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The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism
the element of negation is entirely unfelt in it. If the comprehension of the negation of the opposite be made a condition of the comprehension of the meaning of a term, i.e., of a determinate concept, the result would be an absurdity. Is the negation of the opposite, e.g., not-not-cow, which the Buddhist contends to be the meaning or a term, a determinate concept or not? If determinate, is it felt to be so by virtue of the comprehension of its opposite ? If it be so, the negation of the opposite, viz., of notnot-cow, would be felt as a determinate fact only by the felt negation of its opposite, viz., of not-not-not-cow. But the second negation would again require another negation of the opposite in order to be made determinate. In other words, there would be an infinite regression and this would make a dead-lock inevitabe. If, however, the distinction of the negation, negatum and of the substratum of negation be not felt, no selective activity would be possibe. If it be maintained that negation of the opposite is a determinate concept felt by itself, without involving reference to any other negation, the contingency of infinite regress would be avoided, no doubt. But then there would be no logical or psychological justification for making the comprehension of the negation of the opposite a condition of the comprehension of a determinate concept. The cow-concept, being equally determinate, should be admitted to be felt by itself without reference to the negation of its opposite. The positive concept should be felt as determinate by reason of its being possessed of a distinctive character (svarüpabheda), in which negation has no part to play.
The Buddhist may contend that the distinctive character (svarūpabheda) spoken of is nothing but the negation of the opposite, and the positive character of a thing consists in what is distinguished from the opposite. Whatever it may be alleged to be, it is undeniable that this character must be real and not fictitious, which negation is avowed to be. A fiction has no character of its own, which can distinguish it from other fictions. It must, therefore, be admitted that the universal is not a fiction as it has a distinctive character. The cow-concept has a content which is different from that of a horse-concept.
1. Op. cit., p. 283.
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