________________
The Nyāya Conceptions of Universals
231
Moreover, the relation of substance and attribute cannot be one of absolute difference. The attribute must be identical with the being of the substance. So a word or a concept, which does not signify an attribute of a thing, cannot signify the identity of the same. To take an example, the word or concept 'cow' does not signify an attribute of the horse and consequently the substance horse. If the concept 'cow' did not signify an attribute of the cow, it could not signify the cow as a real either.
The Naiyáyika observes that the argument is based on the supposition of identity between substance and attribute which is an unwarranted assumption. The difference of attributes from substance is a felt fact and there is no logical necessity for repudiating it. So the knowledge of the substance does not carry the necessity of the knowledge of the attribute. The subject predicate relation in a proposition is based upon this truth. The nature of a thing is determined by the evidence of undisputed experience and no amount of a priori logic can override its deliverance. The Buddhist contention, that the knowledge of the subject necessarily involves the knowledge of the predicate could be accepted, if it were true that the subject or the cognition of the subject or the conditions of the cognition of the subject involve necessarily the cognition of all possible attributes that could be predicated of it. But the fact is quite otherwise. The conditions of the cognition of the subject differ from the conditions of the cognition of the predicate and they are neither coincident nor simultaneous. The cognition of the attribute is rather conditional upon that of the subject and the Buddhist puts the cart before the horse by making the former the condition of the latter.1
The Buddhist puts forward another conention that if a word or a necessary logical concomitant were incompetent to convey these attributes, the organ of perception should equally fail to do so. But the contention is inspired by superficial analogy.
1. yat tu.śakter abhedad ity ảdi, tat tada sobheta, yadi dharmimătradhinas tadbodhamåträdhinas tăvanmåtrabodhasāmagryadhino vā yāvadupådhibhedabodhaḥ syāt, na caivam. ibid., p. 326.
2. etena bhedad dharmiņah pratitảy api śabdalingadvāră dharmāņām ced apratitiḥ, indriyadvāră ’pi mã 'bhūd ity ädikam tu karņasparse katicalanam apăstam. Ibid. p. 327.
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
