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The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism
relations and there is no reason for departure from this universal principle in the case of causality being the attribute of an entity.
We have finished our enquiry into the reality of relations and it is time to address ourselves to the problem of inherence (samavāya) which we promised to discuss in the beginning of this chapter. Although there is no specific necessity for dwelling on inherence as our findings recorded above will apply to it in full, we yet feel called upon to give a special consideration to inherence, since it has been postulated by the Vaiseșika philosopher to reconcile the discrepancy and antagonism of opposite entities. Substance and quality and action, universal and particular, are believed to be mutually opposed and irreconcilable by their very nature. But still they are held together in a unity by inherence in spite of the fact that they do not transcend their oppositional character even in the act of being forced into a unity. The Vaišesika believes in the difference of reals and their mutual opposition. He holds identity and difference to be absolutely opposed to each other and asserts that relation by inherence effects a combination of the two in one entity without introducing difference into its constitution as an essential trait. The Vaišeșika theory of inherence is thus the antithesis of the Jaina position that the nature of things is composed of opposite characteristics. The Vaiseșika believes identity to be exclusive of difference and existence to be incompatible with non-existence. In other words, he retains his faith in the absolute validity of the Laws of Thought as propounded by pure logic and still seeks to reconcile the antagonism of opposites by means of inherence -- which in his judgment is the universal solvent of all problems. If inherence can achieve all this, the Jaina metaphysics must be given wide berth. The importance of the problem is thus paramount and the Jaina must meet the challenge of the Vaišeşika. With these prefatory remarks we now propose to examine the Vaibesika position as developed by the exponents of the school and we shall consider the Jaina's reflections upon it at the end..
The Vaišeșika maintains that inherence, in the first place, is a relation which is one in all such cases and the difference of terms does not affect the unity of inherence. In the second place,
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