________________
Relations
207
(ayutasiddhi) of the terms so related. But the concept of inseparability is not capable of being justified. If the meaning of the concept be supposed to be co-existence in the same substratum, that is certainly not a fact, if we are to believe in the Vaiśeşika technique. The whole exists in the parts and the parts exist in a different substratum. Qualities exist in a substance, which, in its turn, exists in a different locus. So co-existence in the same substratum cannot be the meaning of the term 'inseparability'. Again if we are to follow the plain testimony of experience, milk and water mixed together exist in the same vessel. But the Vaiseṣika does not posit inherence as their relation. Moreover, the concept of inseparability, being the negative counterpart of separability (yutasiddhi), derives its significance from the latter by contrast. And if existence in different substrata be the criterion of separability, and if its negation be the meaning of the opposite concept (inseparability), then time, space, selves (ātman), being ubiquitous and eternal, would be related by way of inherence. These substances are according to the Vaiseṣika, simple uncaused entities and as such they cannot exist in parts or in any locus. They are self-existent, and besides, being ubiquitous, they are not separable from one another. But they are not supposed to stand in the relation of inherence, the terms of which have been specified as part and whole, quality and substance, universal and particular and so on.
It may be contended that inseparability connotes the absence of separate status. But separation in status is an ambiguous. expression. It may mean separate perception or separate origination or separate existence. But the universal has a distinctive nature from that of the individual and as such they are known separately and as separate entities. As for separate origination, this does not hold good of universals, which are ex hypothesi eternal and uncaused entities. Besides, substance is held to be the cause of its qualities and as such the former must have its existence prior to that of the latter. So absence of separate origination cannot be maintained as the criterion of inherence. The third possibility is equally untenable as space, time, and the like have no separate existence from one another but nobody posits the relation of inherence between them. Let it again be supposed that inseparability means co-existence in the same time,
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
