Book Title: Jaina Philosophy of Non Absolutism
Author(s): Satkari Mookerjee, S N Dasgupta
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

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Page 206
________________ 184 The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism presupposes that like causes produce like effects. Our organs were incapable of envisagingcausality by themselves and they could not be supposed to transcend this incapacity even if they were supposed to be reinforced by memory. Nor can perception of concomitance in agreement and in difference give knowledge of causality. We have seen that perception gives knowledge of the terms and not of the relation. As regards perception of concomitance in difference, it is nothing but the fact that the terms are not perceived, but only the empty locus where the terms could be perceived if they were present. So perception and non-perception together do not possess any special advantage over perceptual cognition, which has been found to yield knowledge of the terms in isolation and not in relation.1 Moreover, the causal relation in question is not supposed to be confined to the observed data. It is believed to hold good, universally between the two classes of entities without exception and without failure. It is unthinkable that perceptual cognition, no matter whether determinate or indeterminate, may be competent to take stock of such universal relation. The aforesaid incompetency of perceptual knowledge can be entirely realised if we analyse the concept of causality. What is a cause ? It is nothing but that which possesses the power to produce an effect. So causality is nothing but power. But power is not capable of being perceived. It can be inferred from the observation of its effect. But inference of the causal power is possible only if the necessary universal relation between the power and the entity is known before. We have seen that perceptual knowledge is incompetent regarding this universal relation, and inference presupposes such knowledge as its condition. Causality is thus not capable of being known either by perception or by inference. The knowledge of causality must then be set down as a subjective, construction or a way of thought. The necessity and universality felt to attend this relation cannot therefore be anything more than the necessity of our way of thinking, which has nothing to do with objective reality. And even if its objectivity be granted, it must remain eo ipso unknown and unknowable.2 1. ibid., pp. 511-12. 2. ibid., pp. 511-12. Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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