________________
112
The Jaina Philosophy of Non- Absolutism
reasonable of all. The word is a negative term and has no positive significance. It simply asserts that the real quâ possessed of existence and non-existence as co-equal attributes is not capable of being expressed by a word, as no word can have such a double sense. The negation of expressibility is an attribute by itself, which is different from the unique inexpressible attribute resulting from the compresence of existence and nonexistence.
But does not the absolute denial of expressibility contradict the Jaina position that all predicates are concomitant with their opposites ?1 Is it not further in flagrant opposition to the explicit assertion of Samantabhadra, a great authority on Jaina philosophy, that the affirmation of the predicate 'inexpressible' would be illogical if the subject were absolutely incapable of being expressed ?2 The import of the proposition seems to be as follows: “If a real as endowed with existence and non-existence were inexpressible by all words, it could not be so expressed even by the term 'inexpressible'.” But this cannot be the interpretation since it involves a contradiction. It is the position of the Jaina that a real cannot be expressed by language as possessed of both being and non-being. Now, if it be the truth that the word 'inexpressible' could express this very attribute, how can it be said to be inexpressible? It involves a contradiction in terms to assert that a thing is inexpressible as both being and non-being and in the same breath to affirm that it is expressible in respect of both these attributes by the term 'inexpressible'. The contradiction is on all fours with the contradiction that is involved in asserting that the pen exists quâ pen and does not exist quâ pen. The interpretation propounded above is wrong. The real interpretation of the proposition should be as follows: “A real is certainly capable of being affirmed as existent or nonexistent each at a time, but it is not capable of being affirmed as existent and non-existent both at the same time and by a single word. If, however, a real were inexpressible even as existent or non-existent, as the Buddhist holds, then assertion
1. The proposition will be elucidated in the next chapter. 2. avācyataikānte 'py uktir nā 'vācyam 'iti yujyate. AM, I, Ch, II. 32.
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
