________________
114
The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism
cognition is suicidal. If language cannot communicate reality, why should the Buddhist make use of it for proving his contention and for disproving the position of others ? All philosophical arguments, which are necessarily conducted by means of language, would have to be condemned as false. Why should not again the word 'cow' denote a horse, when words are absolutely ungrounded in reality ? As regards the lucidity of perceptual cognition, that alone does not give it the stamp of authenticity. Even erroneous perception possesses this lucidity, but that does not make it veridical. So the test of authenticity of cognitions must be found in verification or non-contradiction, and if this be available, there is no reason to call in question the truth of verbal inferential knowledge. Both perceptual and non-perceptual cognition must then be believed to be founded upon objective reality though perceptual cognition makes us acquainted with all the distinctive features of the real. A word may give us only a concept, but why should concepts be condemned as devoid of objective affiliation ? And, as regards indeterminate perception it is as good as non-existent, until it is interpreted by concepts. Further, if concepts have no bearing upon reality and, hence, have no place in perceptual cognition, how can they convert such intuition into knowledge ? Indeterminate perception cannot determine itself as perception of this or that. It is concepts which make it determinate. We have fully discussed the relation of concepts to reality and their status in perceptual cognition in Chapter IV and the reader will do well to read the present discourse in connexion with what has been said therein.
As regards the absolute sceptic who condemns all knowledge as false, it should suffice to observe that apart from the self-contradiction in which he involves himself when he makes such assertions, the position is absurd on the face of it. A cognition is false when it is contradicted by a veridical cognition, but a veridical cognition must have a veridical standard in comparison with which its truth can be ascertained.. But the sceptic cannot appeal to any such standard or criterion when he condemns all cognitions as false. How does he again convince himself of the errors in the positions of other thinkers ? If his conviction be also false,
1. Vide Chapter IV.
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
