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The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism
been sufficiently proved by the Jaina, is not exclusive or extremistic. It is existent-cum-non-existent. The charge of contradiction, as pointed out by Nagarjuna, holds unassailable against those who regard existence and non-existence as absolute and exclusive characteristics. But absolutism is due to abstractionist tendency of our thought, which requires to be checked and revised in consonance with experience, which is the ultimate source of knowledge of the existence of things and of their relations. Experience does not warrant such extremistic characterization of reality and so the finding of contradiction is based upon a hasty study of facts. The fault and fallacy of Nägarjuna and his followers lie in their acquiescence in the interpretation of reality by those very philosophers whom they criticized. Instead of taking their interpretation of the nature of things on trust they should have gone into the original field. Nägarjuna also has not succeeded in preventing himself from falling a prey to the facile observation and superficial exposition of the professional philosophers who held the field. The antinomies, which are inherent in the professional orthodox theories, did not escape his vigilant logical vision. But this should have given him a reason for pause and impressed upon him the necessity of fresh thinking on the nature of reality. Någarjuna failed to do this and transferred the antinomies, which are inherent in the traditional theories, to the nature of things. The result is unrelieved scepticism, which gloats over the failure of professional philosophers. He was not serious enough to contemplate whether an alternative explanation was possible.
The Jaina begins from where the sceptic stopped. Instead of being satisfied with the finding of antinomies in the current theories, the Jaina directs his attention to the fresh study of reals. The result is the discovery of anekāntavāda, the law of the multiple nature of reality. It corrects the partiality of philosophers by supplementing the other side of reality, which escaped them. The effect is both pre-existent and nonexistent. So far as it is a passing phase of the causal substance and so far as it is a novel emergence it is pre-non-existent. But so far as it is a continuation of the causal substance it is preexistent. The same is true of identity and difference. The effect and the cause are identical and different both. There
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