________________
Absolute Negativism and Absolute Particularism
93
Naiyāyika asserts the fact is undeniable that names and nameables are bound together by a nexus, which are, to all intents and purposes, given as accomplished facts and not created by us. That the name stands for the real and not for a subjective idea is, we hope a conclusion which the Buddhist has not succeeded in demolishing.
We have not dealt with another objection of the Buddhist which seems to possess a good deal of plausibility. It is urged that the sensuous intuition, which is generated by direct contact with the objective real, can take cognisance of the real as it is in itself. In other words, only particular as a particular can be cognised by sense-perception. If sense-perception were to cognise the particular as belonging to a class, that is to say, if it were conceptual in character, it could do so only by recalling the name of the object. But the recollection of the name would detach the senseperception from the object. So sense-perception must be regarded as non-reflective and non-conceptual. But this argument does not care to consult the psychology of perception. It is incontestable that the perceptual judgment is felt to be cognisant of the real object. To deny its perceptual character on the ground of a priori considerations does not seem to be a sound procedure, logically or psychologically. Moreover, the argument is suicidal even to the Buddhist. Perceptual judgment is believed by the Buddhist to be conditioned by sense-perception. But senseperception can give rise to the perceptual judgment only if there be a recollection of the name of the thing perceived. The recollection of the name, standing as it does, between the sense-perception and the perceptual judgment, would cut off the latter from the former. That being so, perceptual judgment would not be conditioned by sense-perception -- a position which the Buddhist cannot endorse.
The Jaina thinks that all knowledge including perceptual knowledge is of a determinate nature which is opposed to doubt. The Buddhist hypothesis of indeterminate cognition is not supported by experience. Only doubt can be indeterminate. The Jaina does not also admit that determinate knowledge is always dependent upon verbal association. Verbal association is only an accident due to knowledge of language. In adult psychology conceptual thought is always seen to be mixed with sub-vocal speech
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
