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CHAPTER V 3 THE INEXPRESSIBLE OR THE INDEFINITE Hib
We have discussed the reasons which the Buddhist Fluxist put forward to support his position that reality in and by itself is not capable of being expressed by words. Words, it has been asserted, deal with concepts and that reals being particulars, distinct and different from one another, have nothing to do with concepts. But we have shown that the Buddhist theory raises difficulties which are insoluble for pure logic, upon which he banks. The Jaina philosopher maintains that reals are not particulars alone, but particulars having universals as elements. The universal is not an independent entity, but is realised in so far as it is an element in the particular. The particular is, thus, a
crete entity having the universal for its content or filling. The Jaina also maintains that being and non-being are equally predicable of a real and, as such, they are elements in its constitution We have made out that being and non-being are not wholecharacteristics which are mutually exclusive. We have further shown that there is no contradiction in the fact that a real is existent in one context and non-existent in another context and how the denial of this truth lands the Buddhist in a hopeless self-contradiction. Absolutist logic has been shown to be grievously inadequate to impart insight into the nature of reality and the difficulties of the Buddhist philosophers have been shown to be their own creations arising out of love for absolutist ways of thinking in utter disregard of experience.
We now propose to consider the consequences of absolutism in another school of thought. The Mimāṁsist's view of reality is closely analogous to the Jaida conception. The former believes in the dual nature of reals. A real is always both existent and non-existent, as both the characteristics are attested by experience, which is not contradicted. But this formulation suffers from a vital defect in that it does not set forth the limitations, subject to which the predication of existence or non-existence is logically possible. It cannot be a fact that a thing is existent in the same 1. As. p. 129.
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