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The Inexpressible or the Indefinite
107
Jaina maintains, and in this he is fully endorsed by the Mimāṁsist, that each word has a definite meaning which cannot be the meaning of another word. As regards the so-called homonyms, they are numerically different terms and it is by reason of their phonological similarity that they are regarded as one word. The term 'gau' is said to mean "heaven,' 'a point of compass,' 'a cow,' 'a word,' 'a ray of light,' and so on. But the terms are not the same, though similar. Each term varies with each meaning. The unity is only a pseudo-unity due to similarity. If a single individual word could signify many things, there would be no logical impossibility for one word to signify all things. If the possibility of one word signifying more than one were conceded, the determinate relation of word and its import would not be capable of being logically justified.
This demonstration of the incapacity of the individual terms for more than one meaning constitutes a refutation of propositions yielding more than one judgment. The third proposition in the chain of sevenfold predication, which predicates existence and non-existence of the same subject, is not, strictly speaking, one proposition, but two propositions. It is due to the similarity of order and phonetic similarity that the two propositions are treated as one. The numerical difference of the proposition will be apparent from the consideration that the predicates are communicated in succession and not at a time to our consciousness. If, however, the import of the third proposition is considered to be the co-equality of the two attributes successively understood, the proposition may be regarded as one in point of fact. The unity or multiplicity of a proposition can be determined by the unity or multiplicity of the predicate, and if the predicate of the third proposition be the co-equality of existence and non-existence and not the two distinct attributes, the proposition under consideration should be regarded as a factually unitary proposition.
But why should not a word signify more than one thing ? It is a question of fact and not of logic. We can only appeal to experience for the determination of the problem. Words signify things by virtue of possessing a capacity for signifying or suggesting these facts. What power is possessed by what word is a
1. SBT, p. 32.
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