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Numérical Difference and Absolute Non-Existence
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beyond the first moment, it would have no scope for change of attributes. The fluxist, in spite of all appearances to the contrary has to conclude that things are static and unchanging and to declare all change to be an unmitigated appearance. He proceeds from the datum of change and comes to a conclusion which denies it. This is self-contradictory. Then again he starts with causal efficiency as the equivalent of existence and comes to a conclusion which makes causal efficiency impossible. We have proved in Chapter II that there can be no causal relation between momentary existents. This is another contradiction in the fluxist position. The Jaina c: nception of reality avoids the Scylla of fluxism and the Charybdis of illusionism. I cannot conceive of any other philosophy which can maintain realism against the onslaughts of idealists without endorsing the Jaina conception. A real is that which not only originates, but is also liable to cease and at the same time capable of persisting. Exiscence, cessation and persistence are the fundamental characteristics of all that is real. To a person trained in the school of a priori logic the proposition may sound paradoxical and even selfcontradictory. But we have taken sufficient pains to demonstrate that the reading of contradiction in it is due to preconceptions fostered by a priori logic. This concept of reality is the only one which can avoid the conclusion that the world of plurality, which is the world of experience, is an illusion. Either the world is to be accepted as real or dismissed as an unreal appearance. The latter conclusion is drawn by the Vedānt st. But if realism is to be maintained it can only be done by means of Jaina logic and Jaina conception of reality. We have shown how Nyāya and Sankhya have failed to explain causation and change. A system of philosophy which fails to account for these two fundamental problems cannot lay claim to unqualified allegiance.
The affirmation of origination, cessation and persistence as elements in the constitution of reals has to be substantiated. We have shown that a real is always changing and the change of attributes, that occurs at every moment, is due both to its internal dynamic constitution and to its relation with the infinite plurality of reals. We have seen that change presupposes the persistence of an underlying stuff. So persistence is to be accounted as an element in a real together with change. But
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