________________
Non-Absolutism
compelled to concede that varieties of non-existence are more or less unreal constructions. The Cārvāka would conclude that non-existence as such is a metaphysical fiction, uncritically hypostatized as an obiective fact on the evidence of concepts, which do not stand the test of critical analysis. Non-existence, whether as a part of positive reals or an independent fact having no logical sanction, should be boldly asserted to be a fiction, pure and simple.
The Jaina does not believe that the Cårvāka has made out an unimpeachable case for the unreality of negation. The idea of negation is there, and there is no reason why it should be an ungrounded illusion. It is not an illusion, as it is not invalidated by the testimony of subsequent experience. Whether one may like the idea or not, one cannot get rid of it as much as one cannot get rid of the idea of existence. If non-existence be a metaphysical fiction, there is no reason for preferential treatment of existence. Both should be discarded or accepted without reservation. Of course the Vaiseșika view of independent non-existence is riddled with difficulties. But non-existence as an element in the make-up of positive existents should be regarded as factual. The objections of the Cårvāka are not insurmountable. Of course, the position would be hopeless if the sceptic's objections were backed by logic. Let us examine whether the difficulties are real or only conjured up by sophistry. Let it be granted that the immediate antecedent phase of the causal stuff constitutes the pre-non-existence of the relevant effect. Yet, the consequence alleged, that there would be continuous existence of the effect throughout the past except at the last moment when the immediate phase comes into being, would not arise. The difficulty raised by the Cårvāka, if sincere, is due to the oversight of the difference between post-non-existence and other types of non-existence. . The effect is the negation of pre-non-existence, whereas the immediate antecedent phase of the cause is the pre-non-existence of the effect. It was not in evidence in the past and so the question of its post-non-existence before its emergence and consequently the emergence of the effect before its time have no raison d'etre. There is the absence of pre-non-existence and of the effect both in the past, and there is no incongruity in it. The effect is incompatible with the
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
