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The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism
But the Vedāntist would urge that if the appearance of a content as an other to consciousness be only an illusion as admitted by the Buddhist idealist, then why should one consciousness be held to be different from another consciousness? The difference is felt owing to the difference of contents associated. But when contents are illusory and their association is only a false appearance, why should the difference of contents be made the ground of assertion of difference in consciousness ? The difference of subject and object, the cognizer and cognized, in the same consciousness-unit is a felt fact. But still the experience of the two poles is not believed to argue a real difference in the consciousness-unit on the ground that the difference is only illusory. Parity of logic and consistency of argument demand that the difference of contents, illusory as they are, should not affect the unity of consciousness as such. Not only this. The affirmation of absolute identity between consciousness and content on the part of the Buddhist idealist would, on the contrary, make it impossible for him to meet the criticism of the Buddhist Śūnyavādin who would deny the reality of consciousness and its content alike. If consciousness is identical with its content, which is admitted to be a false appearance, why should not consciousness also be regarded as a false appearance ? Certainly between two things held to be identical, one cannot be regarded as real and the other as unreal. If a content is denied independent reality on the ground that it is never cognised outside and apart from consciousness, such also should be the case with consciousness, which is never felt apart from a content. If the variation of contents and the unvariant continuity of consciousness be the proof of the superior status of consciousness, why should the Buddhist believe in the multiplicity of consciousness-units ? Moreover, the relation of content and consciousness cannot be regarded as one of real identity, as the difference of content from consciousness is felt in experience. So not only identity but also difference are equally felt facts and as this is not compatible with real identity, the relation is held to be one of illusory identity by the Vedāntist, since identity-cum-difference is according to him a contradiction in terms. And illusory identity
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