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The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism
made in deference to the dictum that the effect is the negation of pre-non-existence, But since the negation of such pre-nonexistence is found in the whole antecedent history of the cause, the issue of the pre-existence of the effect is unavoidable. A different approach may be made to find a way out of the cul de sac. It might be maintained that the immediate antecedent phase may be regarded as the pre-non-existence of the effect and the effect may be regarded as the destruction of the prenon-existence. As the phases previous to the phase called prenon-existence do not constitute the destruction of the pre-nonexistence, the question of the pre-existence of the effect does not arise. But the defence smacks of the Buddhist position which holds the destruction of the previous moment and the origination of the next moment as equivalent. The Jaina cannot consistently adopt this position as he maintains that pre-nonexistence is devoid of a beginning. Being unbounded by a previous time-limit it cannot be identified with the immediate antecedent phase, which is bounded by all that goes before and comes after. If, in the alternative, it is held to be distinct from all the previous phases of the causal stuff as identification with any one phase would raise all the difficulties, the pre-nonexistence would not be an element in the being of the cause, which is the Vaiseṣika position, and it has been found to be unacceptable.
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The beginningless existence of pre-non-existence may however be asserted to be a fact with reference to its identity with the causal substance, as the substance quâ substance exists from eternity. But this seems to be a poor defence. If pre-nonexistence be given a beginningless status on the basis of its identity with beginningless substance, it would be regarded as destitute of end also, as substance, quâ substance has no end. But in the case of endless persistence of pre-non-existence there would be no occasion for the emergence of the effect, as the effect can come into existence only on the cessation of pre-nonexistence. So pre-non-existence as a part of existent has no logical sanction. Nor can it be held to be an independent category, as there is no proof of it. It may be contended that such judgments as 'the jar was not existent before its origination' are cognisant of non-existence. But the contention falls
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