Book Title: Jaina Philosophy of Non Absolutism
Author(s): Satkari Mookerjee, S N Dasgupta
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

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Page 50
________________ 28 The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism assumes the form of cogniser and cognised in one. The same cognition is transformed into the likeness of an object, which becomes the content, and in its rôle as pure cognition it functions as the cogniser. This is the epistemology of perception of the Sauträntika realist, according to whom the direct object of cognition is never the external object, but the content as part and parcel of the cognition. The external object is a matter of inference according to the Sautrāntika. Barring this difference of metaphysical position, both the Sautrāntika and the Yogăcăra are agreed on the dual character and the dual rôle of cognition, In the case of non-perceptual cognition also the same dual rôle is asserted with equal emphasis. The content, which is identical in being with the cognition, is believed to stand for the unperceived object, e.g., the fire as inferred from s nition in its cognitive capacity is assumed to be the cogniser The opposition of the cogniser and the cognised is evident, but still their coalescence in the selfsame cognition is believed to be a fact and that without spelling a contradiction. If the contradiction is denied on the strength of the undisputed testimony of experience, the same solution cannot be discarded in the case of cause and effect, as experience is unmistakable in its verdict in this case also. This is not the only advantage in the Jaina position. It gives us a satisfying explanation of the law of causation, the belief in which is irresistible for all human beings and is the conditio sine quâ non of all scientific and practical activity. The absolutistic standpoint of the other schools of thought fails to offer any explanation. The heroic course adopted by the Vedantist and the Sūnyavādin does not again commend itself as the only alternative metaphysical explanation. The result is identical. Both the fluxist and the Vedāntic idealist fail to render a realistic explanation of the law of causation, as the condition of causal operation, succession or non-succession, which are the necessary concomitants of time-continuum, are denied, and the chain of cause and effect is reduced to the position of an intellectual construction. The Jaina theory avoids the fallacies incident to 1. For the elaborate exposition of succession and non-succession as the condition of causal operation I refer the reader to my book The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, Chapters I and IV. Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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