Indian Antiquary Vol 56

Author(s): Richard Carnac Temple, Charles E A W Oldham, Krishnaswami Aiyangar
Publisher: Swati Publications

Page 24

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THE INDIAN ANTIQUARY
assemblies of 600 B.C. to A.D. 600; Hindu kingship from the earliest age to A.D. 600; the Council of Ministers under Hindu monarchy from 1000 B.C. to A.D. 600; the judiciary from 700 B.C. to A.D. 600; the theory of taxation from 1000 B.C. to A.D. 600; and Hindu imperial systems from 1000 B.C. to A.D. 600. It will be apparent from this list of subjects that the book provides much interesting historical information and offers plenty of food for reflection.
Within the limits of a 'review' it is impossible to deal in detail with the contents of this erudite work, and I will therefore confine my remarks to a brief notice of a few points which aroused my particular interest. Among these is the suggestion that the Buddhist Samgha, the most vital feature of the Church founded by Gautama, was modelled upon and named after the political Samgha, which was synonymous with Gana, signifying a Republic. According to the author, these Hindu republics were administered by a deliberative body, composed of various classes of the population, and were styled ayudhajivin or sastropajivin-two somewhat obscure terms, of which Mr. Jayaswal suggests an explanation. In the Buddhist age the republican form of government was apparently flourishing; the literature of that period mentions at least seven republican states; and between them they must have provided plenty of constitutional material to serve as a pattern to the Buddha, when he address. ed himself to the task of organizing his ecclesia. The arrangements prevailing in the republic of the Lichchhavis are rightly treated in some detail, as the Lichchhavi State lasted from early days until the era of Gupta imperialism, and during practically the whole of that period occupied a position of great importance.
Mr. Jayaswal stoutly opposes the late Dr. Vincent Smith's view that these republican ganas were of Mongolian origin, and that the Lichchhavis themselves possessed Tibetan affinities. He points out that Smith's view was based on the custom of exposure of the dead, as supposed to be illustrated by a passage in a Chinese legend, and secondly on the judicial procedure of the Lichchhavis, as described by Turnour. The Chinese legend is admittedly about a thousand years later in date than the period to which it purports to refer, while the description which it contains can be shown, on the analogy of passages in the Dharma Sastra and Sanskrit dramatic works, to be applicable to the ordinary Hindu smaśâna, and not to refer necessarily to Tibetan or Iranian burial customs. Similarly, the supposed evidence of Lichchhavi judicial procedure is stated to be illusory by the juxta-position of Turnour's description and the account of the stages of Tibetan criminal procedure given by Rai Bahadur Sarat Chandra Das. Mr. Jayaswal depends also upon a passage in the Mahabharata to establish his contention that
[ JANUARY, 1927
| Lichchhavi criminal procedure was based on rules normally followed by Hindu Ganas or republican states. He likewise adduces evidence which suggests the probability of the Lichchhavis themselves being pure Hindu Kshatriyas, having no racial connection with Tibet. The same conclusion has been reached by Mr. Bimala C. Law in his Kshatriya Clans in Buddhist India. It is stated in the preface that Dr. Vincent Smith was largely responsible for the inception of Mr. Jayaswal's work, and it is a matter of regret that he did not live to see its completion.
In the second part of his work, dealing with Hindu Monarchy, the author dissents quite as strongly from another statement in Smith's Early History of India to the effect that "the native law of India has always recognised agricultural land as crown property." Colebrooke's essay on Mimamad, the dicta of Hindu lawyers like Nilakantha, Madhava, and Katyayana, the statements of accepted commen. tators, the Játaka, and copper-plate title-deeds of the Gupta period, are martialled together to prove that the ancient Hindu legal doctrine regarding proprietorship in land was the exact reverse of what it is stated to be by Dr. Smith in the abovequoted sentence. Mimâmed declares emphatically that the king has no property in the soil; and this is in consonance with the opinions of ancient constitutional writers, who decided that the king is in the position of a servant of the body politic, obtaining his wages in the shape of taxes, but possessing no proprietorship in the land. Mr. Jayaswal further asserts that the English translation of the sloka, on which Smith depended to re-inforce his view, contains a fundamental error, pati being rendered 'owner' instead of 'protector,' and the latter portion being wholly misconstrued. Whether Mr. Jayaswal's arguments can be success. fully parried, is a question into which I cannot here enter.
In a chapter on Technical Hindu Constitutions' from 1000 B.C., the author touches upon the Râshtrikas of Western India and appears to treat the Pettanikas or Petenikas of Asoka's inscriptions as a separate political entity, of which the rulers or leaders had contrived to obtain hereditary status. This view does not tally with that adopted by Professor D. R. Bhandarkar in his Carmichael Lectures for 1923. He states that Petenikas cannot be separated from Râshtrika and Bhoja, and that it is a qualifying word or adjective, signifying "one who is hereditary ruler of a rashtra or province." Mr. Jayaswal suggests that the Rashtrikas obtained their name from their political constitution-the Rashtrika, which was purely republican in character, the administration being vested in a board of nonhereditary elected leaders: while the Pettanikas or hereditary leaders' followed a different form of constitution, Pettanika, described as aristocratic or oligarchic. While I do not feel competent to argue