Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture

Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati

Page 54

Anekāntavāda : The Principal Jaina Contribution of Logic
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to continuity ( in one single form) as well as impartibility. Thus the theory of indefinability (anirvacaniyatvavāda) arose as a natural corollary to the doctrine of one continuous real as also to the doctrine of impartite distinct reals. But this theory was taken exception to by the Vaiseșika logicians and others who averred that to describe every real entity (vastumatra) is not only a possibility but an accomplished fact. Thus arose the theory of definability (nirvacaniyatvavāda) that came in clash with the rival theory of indefinability (aninacaniyaivavāda).
In a like manner, some people upheld the view that it is dangerous to arrive at a final conclusion by means of an organ of knowledge--of whatever sort-unaided by reason (hetu) or logic (tarka); others, on the contrary, maintained that logic possesses no independent force, and that the Scripture, inasmuch as it does possess an independent force, is the senior most (murdhanya) of all organs of knowledge. Hence the clash between these two viewpoints. Again, the fatalist (daiva-vādhin) would say that everything depends on fate (daiva) and the human endeavour (purusartha) is independently of no avail, the protagonist of human endeavour would maintain just the opposite view that man's endeavour is independently capable of delivering the goods (kāryakara). Thus each thought that the other was in the wrong. Likewise, one-sided view (naya) emphasized the importances of the denoted entity (ariha) at the cost of denoting word (sabda), the other that of the denoting word at the cost of the denoted entity; and the two argued against each other. Similarly, some thought that absence (abhava) is an independent entity alongside of the positive one (bhāva) while others that it is but of the nature of the positive entity, and thus developed the attitude of hostility between them. Furthermore, some thought that an organ of knowledge (pramāna) and the resulting piece of knowledge (pramniti) are utterly distinct (aryanta bhinna) from the knower (pramata) concerned, while others that they are non-distinct (abhinna) from the later. Lastly, some emphasized that the sole means for attaining the desired (ultimate) result is action performed in conformity with the Varna-Aśrama rules, others insisted that knowledge alone will lead to absolute) bliss, while still others maintained that devotion (bhakti) is the only instrument for realizing the summum bonum. Thus on a number of major or minor problems pertaining to metaphysics and ethics several such views had been vogue as were extremist (ekanta) and wholly antagonistic to one another