Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture

Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati

Page 257

240 Anekāntavāda and Syādvada
test does not, however, lead of self-contradiction as alleged above. It has been observed, at the outset of the present chapter, that opposition is a logical relation and it is not necessary that the opposite must be of the same ontological status. It is enough if the other opposite if conceivable. Such being the case, the opposite of the non-absolute is not inaccessible. In point of fact, the absolute is of two types, viz., the true absolute and the false absolute and similarly also, the non-absolute is true and false. The true absolute is one of the infinite attributes that are actually present in a real and is envisaged by cognition as it is without implying the negation of the remaining attributes. Such cognition, which takes stock of one attribute without implying the negation of other attributes that are actually present in · it, is called 'partial knowledge' or naya. Naya is not false though it is partial knowledge, provided it takes stock of a real attribute without asserting or implying the negation of other attributes. Such an attribute or such partial cognition is regarded as the 'true absolute (samyagekānta). But when one attribute is apprehended as constituting the whole nature of the real and thus implies the negation of other attributes which are really present, such attribute and such cognition are example of 'the false absolute' (mithyaikänta). Thus there are two types of partial knowledge one true and the other false. The true nature of a real as consisting of an infinite plurality of attributes is, however, apprehended hy a valid knowledge which is called pramana. Such valid knowledge, which takes stock of the several attributes, existence and non-existence also, which are the real properties of the real, is the true non-absolute.' The false non-absolute is illustrated by that kind of knowledge, which takes stock of attributes, which are not really present in the object. It is non-absolute in the sense that it does not affirm one attribute only as constitutive of the whole nature of the real, implying the negation of the other attributes. It is the opposite of absolutism, which consists in the affirmation of one attribute to the exclusion of others. But it is false in that the attributes in question are unreal. So the non-absolute also admits of two varieties—one false and the other true.
Let us apply the results attained to the problem raised, viz., whether sevenfold predication applies to the truth of non-absolutism. The “true non-absolute' has been found to have its opposite in the “true absolute and the sevenfold predication can start on with these tow opposites. 'It is absolute'; 'it is non-absolute'; 'it is both'; “it is inexpressible' (as the two opposites together cannot be thought by a