Book Title: Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture
Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati
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Non-Absolutism (Anekāntavāda) 253
form of verbal representation, the Jaina would only appeal to convention, that is followed. The form of propositions is not necessarily determined by philosophical truth. Take for instance the proposition ‘John is cooking. What is the meaning of the subject, John ? Do we mean that John is only a physical organism, or a spirit, or an embodied spirit ? According to the difference of import the subject should be stated differently in conformity with the objective truth. But no sane man, unless there is a special necessity for definition of the subject, raises any difficulty on the score of ontological truth regarding the form of proposition. It will suffice if the proposition is understood in the intended sense. As regards formal propriety the Jaina will only point to the large volume of usage and the time-honoured custom as his apology.
It may be claimed that the Jaina has succeeded in establishing his position that reals are existent and non-existent both. But if there still be left a lingering doubt or hesitation and further demonstration needed, it can be supplied by the following consideration. The Naiyāyika agrees that the pen does not exist in the jar.15 The non-existence of pen is asserted to subsist in the jar. But such assertions must remain vague and obscure unless the nature of subsistence is determined in precise terms. Is the 'non-existence in question numerically differnt from the jar in which it is asserted to subsist ? If it is different, it must be supposed that the non-existence is non-existent in its substratum. In other words, the identity of the jar and the identity of the non-existence being different, the latter must be non-existent in the former and vice versa. But the same problem will arise in the case of every subsequent non-existence and there will be no end of the process. The vicious infinite is not the only absurdity of the supposition. The second non-existence of the first non-existence will be equivalent to affirmation, according to the dictum ‘Negation of negation is the origional position. 16 And, thus, this will be a case of self-contradiction, since the assertion of non-existence of the pen terminates in the affirmation of its existence. If, on the other hand, the non-existence of the pen be not different from the jar, the jar will have to be regarded as identical with non-existence, just as it is admitted to be identical with existence—the position advocated by the Jaina.
15. We have used 'pen' in the sense of penness or pen-character for the sake of brevity
and for avoiding a clumsy expression. 16. abhavavirahatmatvam vastunah pratiyogita, NKU, Ch. III. 2.
