Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture

Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati

Page 341

324 Anekāntavāda and Syādvādá
when the Jinendra prevailed, must be considered, however, to be of high significance in the history of Indian Thought. While other systems stand each for a well-rounded compact view of the Universe, Jainism, as represented by its syadvada, finds in them all a side-view only, which can be relatively true at the most but not absolutely. This is the fundamental position of the Jaina theory of knowledge, and it is this which was, to my mind, meant to be emphasised by the exponents of the doctrine, by the short term that has furnished a fulcrum to many a controversy and criticism.
The position meant would appear, however, to be very aptly suggested by the very cursed term. The particle Syāt in the expression literally means perhaps, which, when applied to any piece of knowledge, means perhaps true. This does not imply that there is absolutely any doubt about the knowledge. It means simply partially true, as it has been well put by some writer. The position of Jainism is not here a sceptic one, as it might otherwise be supposed to be by the literal interpretation of this particle Syät in the phrase. On the contrary, it emphasises by the particle one of the soundest truths about our intellectual achievements, namely, that any ordinary human way of knowledge is bound to be partially and not entirely, relatively and not absolutely, valid. And so any system of human creation, claimed to be perfectly and absolutely true, is necessarily bound to be defective, if not wholly erroneous, when judged by the impartial and wider view of things. This is the fundamental lesson the doctrine teaches, and as such it may be said to be negative. But does it not give expression, by the term, to a profound truth about our intellectual pursuits? What does the history of philosophy, or of science, or of any other intellectual pursuit of man, for the matter of that, show so unmistakably but this sound truth ? We all move on, inevitably as it seems, altering our old way of thought and creating new ones in their place, giving up some elements of the old and replacing them by others, according to our limited standpoints and utlooks, but still far away from the distant ideal of perfect truth. In speaking of the ideal here, we are lead on to what may be called the positive aspect of the doctrine in question here. Does the doctrine really save anything positive about it? It has, at least by implication.
The doc rine of syādvāda relates, as it has been pointed out above, primarily to suman ways of knowledge which are, it maintains, necessarily perfect. The truth-value of such knowledge is but partial and relative. The doctrine means, therefore, that to attain perfect