Book Title: Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture
Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati
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346 Anekāntavāda and Syadvāda
limited and conditional that to transcend the region of what appears to the sense would be beyond human resources unless one is omniscient (Kevali) being. Thus very like the Einsteinian view of truth, things and objects in the universe are true relatively, i.e. relative to the particular space and tiine. Thus speaking of a gold jug, we may say that it is atomic in the sense that it is a composite of earth atoms and not atomic in the sense that it is not a composite of water-atoms. Again it is a composite of earth-atoms only in the sense that gold is a metallic modification of earth, and not any other modification of earth as clay or stone''. 1
Evidently it is only in relation to different standpoints that things and objects, though possessed of infinite determinations (anantadharmātamakam Vastu), can be said to have a particular quality or character. This view which believes in the reality of such a characte: is technically known as naya and is considered to be most catholic in view of the fact that it does nct disregard or reject the views of other thinkers like the Buddhists or the Advaita-Vedāntins, who would lay stress either on the impcrmanent and transitory character of being or on its unchangeable and permanent character. In this sense the Jainas' view of naya is an attempt to reconcile the conflicting claims of the epistemological thinkers giving a death blow to iheir dogmatic approach towards things and their nature that what they think or hold is alone true and real. Thus the nature of being (Sat) then is neither the absolutely unchangeable, nor the momentary changing qualities or existences, but involves them both. This being the case whatever assertion is made with respect to a thing can be true and real relative to a particular universe of discourse or such other factors as space, time or quality and each assertion should, therefore, be understood only in reference thereto. In short, all affirmations made from whatever standpoint (naya) cannot be regarded as absolute and can be true in some (Syādasti) or 'may be it is' sense.
Bradley, on the other hand, considers judgment as a means where with the aid of ideas we express the truth or falsehood in relation to certain fact. These ideas, contrary to what the empiricist thinkers consider, are the expressions of certain meaning which we derive only by the analysis of the judgment itself and in this sense, therefore, they are the results of the adjectives made loose from
1. Dasgupta, S. N.-A History of Indian Phylosophy, Vol. I, Cambridge, 1963, pp.
175-176. 2. Ibid, p. 175.
