Book Title: Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture
Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati
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The Doctrine of Syādvāda 337
the object is seen as possessing subsequent other existence rather than non-existence, if earlier it was seen as possessing co-existence rather than non-existence. Thus M. Hiriyanna remarks:
If we consider for example an object A, we may say that it is, but it is only in a sense, viz, as A and not also as B. Owing to the indefinite nature of reality, what is now or here A, may become B sometime hence or elsewhere.39
This statement seems to be somewhat questionable. Syadvada does not seem to be based as much on the possibility that clay may become cloth as on the fact that clay is not cloth.
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It appears then that the following statement of the doctrine represents the correct traditional understanding of syadvada, in modern terms :
The logical doctrine of Jaina philosophy forms the most important aspect of that school. The fundamental principle of this logical doctrine implies the possibility of a positive and negative predication about the same thing. This doctrine is generally referred to as asti-nästi, is and is not. According to Jaina logic, affirmative predication about a thing depends upon four conditions-sva-dravya, svaksetra, svakala, and svabhāva, i.e. its own substance, its own locality, its own time or duration, and its own nature or modification. Correspondingly, the negative predication about the same thing is conditioned by the four things of an opposite nature-paradravya, parakṣetra, parakāla, and parabhāva, i.e, other substarce, other locality, other time, and other nature. This ornament is made of gold, and it is not made of any other metal-are two obvious predications about the same gold ornament, the affirmation (asti) from the point of view of itself (svadravya) and the negation (năsti) from the point of view of other substance (paradravya). Similarly, it may be said, Socrates was born in Athens, and he was not born in Rome-affirmative predication from svaksetra and negative predication from paraksetra point of view, both referring to the same individual. Likewise, we may affirm the historical period of an individual when we refer to his proper time in history (svakāla), and deny his relationship to any other period of time (parakāla). Tennyson lived in the Victorian age and he did not live in the Elizabethan period. In the same way, the last condition, bhāva or mode may be explianed. Charles I died on the scaffold, and he did not die in his bed. ...
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39. M. Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 164.
