Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture

Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati

Page 322

An Analysis of 'syāt' in Syädvāda 305
opinion is that the former kind of sentences are superior, Jaina logicians seem to maintain that the sentences of the latter kind are the ones to which we assent or from which we dissent. Such assent or dissent is further determined by the feature or features of the occasion on which they are uttered. Such sentences are temporally indefinite to make explicit the full sense of which we have to employ such expressions as 'now' etc. even if, therefore, it is assumed that there is a correspondence between grammatical and logical form of a sentence, yet it requires stipulation of occasion. Independently of such stipulation of occasion our assent to or dissent from is impotent, misleading and even logically indefensible.
IV
Our investigation so far has made it clear that out of the many kinds of possibilities Jaina logicians do not consider technical possibility in the context of Syadvada. The cases where casual consideration are predominent an account of technical or etiological possibilities is significant. But such considerations are unimportant from the point of view of descriptive statements about a thing, the proper context of Syadvada. It is for this reason that such possibilities are beside the point in this context. Similarly, the possibility as minimal probability, too, is nowhere considered. Further, absolute conceptual possibility is not expressly and explicitly employed, although it is possible to say that it is presupposed for explanation of nomological possibility. In the context of Syadvāda three kinds of possibilities are clearly acknowledged : possibility as potentiality, epistemological possibility and nomological as well as existential possibility. Etiological possibility that figures in the causal explanation falls outside the perview of Syadvada.
Jaina logicians and philosophers believe that this world is full of things of dravyas and hence accept, it seems, what A.O. Lovejoy calls the Principle of Plentitude. In this they are in great company of Aristotle and Leibnitz. They further hold that dispositions are actualized in course of time. Possibilities for them, thus figure on two levels : potentiality and actuality. Potentialities are give in order of being, but not necessarily in order of knowing. Actualities are given in order of knowing. This is how they become epistemic possibilties. All our statements, descriptions, and interpretations to which one can assent or from which one can dissent, are and should be occasion sentences and not eternal sentences, although former are explainable in