Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture

Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati

Page 328

Syādvāda 311
We know a thing in relation to its own matter, form, space and time as a positive reality, while in relation to other's matter, form, space and time it becomes a negative entity. When we affirm the two different standpoints successively we get the third judgement-a thing is both real and unreal (of course in two different senses). If we affirm or deny both existence and non-existence simultaneously to any thing, if we assert or negate the two different aspects of being and non-being together, the thing baffles all description. It becomes indescribable i.e. either both real and unreal simultanelustly or neither real nor unreal. This is the fourth judgement. The remaining three are the combinations of the fourth with the first, second and third respectively.
Criticism of Syādvada The Jaina theory is unique. Its logic cannot be incorporated either into two-valued logic (truth and falsity) or many valued logic (truth and falsity or doubtful). The law of double negation also does not apply here. The linguistic philosophers will also say that if Syat is translated as 'prabably then it is probable that is written in metalanguage but if it is translated relatively' then it becomes part of the object language. My own view as indicated above is that it is translated into 'relatively, in a certain sense'. Then every proposition is conditional, you have to state the conditions and presuppositions of every sentence that you utter of have it in mind. The charge of pedantry can be levelled against the Jaina logic.
Next I will deal with the controversial question of 'Is the absolutist criticism of Syadvada justified ?
It is natural that the absolutist should criticise syādvāda because absolutism (especially the advaitic variety) and syādvāda relativism are diametrically opposed to each other in their fundamental presuppositions. Hiriyanna observes, “The half-hearted character of the Jaina enquiry is reflected in the seven-fold mode of predication (Saptabhangi) which stops at giving us the several partial views together, without attempting to overcome the opposition in them by a proper synthesis. It is all right so far as it cautions us against one-sided conclusions but it leaves us in the end with little more than one-sided solutions. The reason for it, if it is not prejudice against absolutism, is the desire to keep close to common beliefs (Hiriyanna-Outlines of Indian Philosophy). Elsewhere also Hiriyanna makes the caustic comment that if all our knowledge concerning